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42Abstract
Global ﬁnancial integration unlocks a huge potential for international risk sharing. We ex-
amine the degree to which international equity holdings act as a risk sharing device in industrial
and emerging economies. We split equity returns into investment income (dividend distribution)
and capital gains to investigate which of the two channels delivers the largest potential for risk
sharing. Our evidence suggests that net capital gains are a more potent channel of risk sharing.
They behave in a countercyclical way, that is they tend to be positive (negative) when the
domestic economy is growing more slowly (rapidly) than the rest of the world. Countries with
more countercyclical net capital gains experience improved consumption risk sharing. The em-
pirical analysis furthermore suggests that these risk sharing properties of net capital gains have
increased through time, in particular in the 1990s and early-2000s, on the back of a declining
equity home bias and ﬁnancial market deepening.
Keywords: International risk sharing, International portfolio diversiﬁcation, Consumption
smoothing, Cross-border investment, Valuation eﬀects
JEL Classiﬁcation: F21, F30, F36
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Over the past years, the global economy has seen an unprecedented deepening of ﬁnancial markets.
Between 1990 and 2006, the total outstanding amount in global equity markets increased sixfold,
from USD 6 trillion to USD 40 trillion. Even when scaled by global GDP, the increase in global
stock market capitalisation is remarkable, from around 30 to over 80 percent of GDP. This ﬁnancial
deepening has been accompanied by even more strongly growing cross-border holdings of ﬁnancial
assets. In the case of portfolio equity assets, cross-border positions increased more than twenty-fold,
from USD 0.7 trillion in 1990 to USD 14 trillion in 2006.
These two trends, ﬁnancial deepening and growing internationalisation of ﬁnancial asset hold-
ings, have profound implications for the global economy. One such implication is that ﬁnancial
investors beneﬁt from improved opportunities for portfolio diversiﬁcation. Cross-border diversiﬁ-
cation reduces the exposure of investors to domestic ﬁnancial markets and thus provides opportu-
nities to smooth returns. This ﬁnancial phenomenon of cross-border portfolio diversiﬁcation has
a macroeconomic ﬂip-side, related to cross-border risk sharing. Risk sharing in a macroeconomic
sense refers, in a country context, to the possibility for economic agents and for consumers in par-
ticular to reduce their exposure to idiosyncratic risks arising from country-speciﬁc output shocks,
and to eﬀectively share these risks with consumers in other countries. Clearly, cross-border ﬁnan-
cial holdings oﬀer one channel to achieve such macroeconomic risk sharing. A number of stylised
models indeed show that complete ﬁnancial markets may allow, under certain assumptions, for
perfect consumption risk sharing, such that the path of consumption over time is not correlated
with the path of domestic output.
A rich empirical literature shows that perfect risk sharing does not hold in the real world. Some
empirical contributions ﬁnd output growth to be actually more highly correlated across countries
than consumption growth, a phenomenon known as the consumption correlations puzzle or the
quantity anomaly. Recent work has conﬁrmed that the degree of risk sharing remains far from
perfect but has nevertheless increased over time. Some authors document an increase in risk
sharing during the second half of the 1990s and in the early-2000s. They attribute this mainly to
the growing internationalisation of portfolios as manifested by a declining home bias of ﬁnancial
investors.
What remains, however, largely unexplored are the concrete operational channels through which
risk sharing operates. For most ﬁnancial instruments, including portfolio equity which is the invest-
ment category reviewed in this paper, there are two distinct channels of returns. The ﬁrst one is
the investment income channel, which works through dividend payments as recorded in the income
balance of the balance of payments. These payments accrue to the disposable income of investors
and may therefore be used directly for consumption smoothing. The second channel is the capital
gains channel, which reﬂects changes in the price of the ﬁnancial assets expressed in the domestic
currency of the investor. While such capital gains do not generate an immediate stream of ﬁnancial
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investment decisions through wealth eﬀects and thereby promote consumption smoothing. The
potential importance of the second channel, i.e. the capital gains channel, has been underscored
in the theoretical literature on valuation eﬀects, but its empirical relevance has so far not been
examined systematically.
This paper examines the potential role of net investment income and net capital gains channel
for consumption risk sharing, with a speciﬁc focus on international portfolio equity holdings. It
uses a newly constructed dataset on capital gains and investment income for 35 industrial and
emerging market economies with up to 35 years of data for most countries. The dataset covers over
90 percent of global stock market capitalisation.
Our main ﬁnding is that the net capital gain channel appears to be more important than the
net investment income channel for risk sharing through portfolio equity holdings. This assessment
is based on a two-step analysis. In a ﬁrst step, we examine the cyclical behaviour of net capital
gains and net investment income. For risk sharing to operate, net capital gains and net investment
income should be countercyclical, i.e. in the event of a negative idiosyncratic shock to domestic
output, a country should beneﬁt from positive net capital gains and from positive net investment
income ﬂows. We ﬁnd that this cyclicality property holds for net capital gains, either scaled to
domestic GDP or using implied real rates of capital gains, but not for net investment income. In a
second step, we look at consumption risk sharing behaviour by estimating a traditional risk sharing
equation that examines co-movements between real consumption and real output. We augment this
equation with cyclicality measures of net capital gains and net investment income and ﬁnd that
countries with more countercyclical net capital gains experience better consumption risk sharing.
These risk sharing properties of net capital gains apply mainly in our subsample of industrial
countries. In emerging market economies, by contrast, results do not hold for both steps of the
analysis, i.e. net capital gains do not behave in the required countercyclical way and they do
not seem to have an inﬂuence on actual consumption risk sharing. This suggests that ﬁnancial
globalisation has so far led to asymmetric beneﬁts globally, in that industrial countries are able to
smooth consumption more easily via the capital gains channel, whereas emerging market economies
do not seem to beneﬁt from such risk sharing.
Another ﬁnding relates to the existence of clear patterns over time. In both steps of the analysis,
we ﬁnd net capital gains to have increasing countercyclicality over time, with a marked increase in
estimated coeﬃcients in particular since the mid-1990s. The analysis highlights that two separate
factors may help explain this increase in the potential role of capital gains as a hedge against
country-speciﬁc shocks, namely (i) a generalised decline in home bias and (ii) a deepening of stock
markets across most countries.
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Global ﬁnancial integration has proceeded rapidly over the past decades. Cross-border holdings of
portfolio equity have expanded from less than 2 percent of global GDP in the early 1970s to over
25 percent in 2005. This has important macroeconomic and ﬁnancial implications. It allows for a
decoupling of saving and investment decisions, facilitates the ﬁnancing of current account deﬁcits,
promotes a more eﬃcient allocation of resources, may spur economic growth, and allows investors
to diversify their risks and smooth their returns.
This last aspect of risk diversiﬁcation relates to a phenomenon known in the literature as cross-
border risk sharing. By diversifying ﬁnancial asset holdings internationally, economic agents hedge
against asymmetric economic shocks that hit their domestic economy. Standard models predict
that ﬁnancial integration can lead to perfect consumption risk sharing, whereby ﬂuctuations in
consumption are decoupled from idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in output (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland,
1992, and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). A rich empirical literature shows that the model-based
prediction of perfect risk sharing does not hold in the real world. Notable empirical contributions
include Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and Lewis (1996), who ﬁnd output growth to be actually
more highly correlated across countries than consumption growth (consumption correlations puzzle
or quantity anomaly). Recent work has conﬁrmed that the degree of risk sharing remains far from
perfect, but has nevertheless increased over time.
What remains, however, largely unexplored are the concrete operational channels through which
risk sharing operates. For most ﬁnancial instruments, including portfolio equity which is the in-
vestment category reviewed in this paper, there are two distinct channels of returns: the ﬁrst one
is the investment income channel, taking the form of dividend payments in the case of portfolio
equity. Investment income is recorded in the income balance of the balance of payments, accrues to
the disposable income of investors and may be used directly for consumption. The second channel
is the capital gains channel, which reﬂects changes in the price of the ﬁnancial assets expressed
in the domestic currency of the investor. Capital gains may therefore result from changes in the
market price of the asset as well as from changes in exchange rates. In the case of portfolio equity,
capital gains include the eﬀect of retained earnings, i.e. earnings that are not paid out in the
form of dividends but that aﬀect the valuation of the company. Such capital gains do not generate
an immediate stream of ﬁnancial ﬂows and are not recorded in the balance of payments. They
may nevertheless, through wealth eﬀects, have an impact on saving and investment decisions and
thereby promote consumption smoothing.
There are no strong priors in support of the investment income channel or the capital gain
channel as the dominant mode through which risk sharing takes place. Arguably, the importance
of one or the other channel may diﬀer on the speciﬁc ﬁnancial instrument at hand. Generally,
one main argument in support of the investment income channel is that income allows to smooth
consumption directly, as it forms part of disposable income, in contrast with capital gains that can
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shows that, for the ﬁnancial instrument under consideration, i.e. portfolio equity, capital gains are
much larger in size than investment income, which would support capital gains as a potentially
more important channel.
There has been limited empirical analysis on these two channels of risk sharing. The income
channel has received some attention, in particular by Lane (2001), who analyses international
investment income ﬂows and ﬁnds limited evidence in support of such ﬂows as a potential source of
income smoothing at business cycle frequencies, and by Artis and Hoﬀmann (2006) who ﬁnd that
growing income ﬂows in recent years fall short of explaining consumption risk sharing.
By investigating the capital gains channel, this paper also relates to the growing literature
on valuation eﬀects. Capital gains and valuation gains as deﬁned in the literature on external
positions are equivalent terms which can be used interchangeably. Valuation eﬀects have come
under close scrutiny in the recent years of accelerating global ﬁnancial integration, but this recent
work is largely theoretical, examining for instance the desirability of capital gains from a welfare
perspective (Benigno, 2006), their role in current account adjustment (Bems and Dedola, 2006;
Cavallo and Tille, 2006), or their implications for the conduct of monetary policy (Hoﬀmann and
Schmidt, 2007). Empirical work on valuation eﬀects remains conﬁned to a few countries, mainly
the United States (e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005 and Gourinchas and Rey, 2007a). Very
few countries (the United States and Australia are examples) provide statistical data, and capital
gains have to be computed indirectly, combining both stock and ﬂow data, to obtain a large cross-
section. Several theoretical contributions have ﬂagged the potential role of the capital gains channel
for international risk sharing (see, for instance, Obstfeld, 2004). On the empirical side, Schmitz
(2007) analyses the potential to hedge domestic output ﬂuctuations by means of capital gains of
foreign investors on domestic stock and bond markets.
Our paper examines one speciﬁc category of international ﬁnancial assets, namely portfolio
equity holdings. The motivation for this is twofold: ﬁrst, available literature on risk sharing suggests
that portfolio equity (alongside FDI) is the main asset category through which cross-country risk
sharing is taking place (Kose, Prasad and Terrones, 2007). Second, data quality and availability
are comparatively better for this type of asset than for other investment categories (FDI and debt),
allowing for the construction of comparatively more reliable estimates of investment income and
capital gains.
The paper starts with the construction of a new dataset on capital gains and investment in-
come on international portfolio equity holdings, using data for 35 industrial and emerging market
economies with up to 35 years of data for most countries. Our main focus is on net capital gains
and net investment income, that is including both the asset and liability side. The country selection
is essentially driven by data availability and quality, but is suﬃciently representative as it covers
over 90 percent of global stock market capitalisation. This allows a unique assessment of the role of
capital gains as a risk sharing device in comparison to the more traditional channel of investment
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Our examination of capital gains and investment income as risk sharing channels proceeds in
two stages. In a ﬁrst stage, we investigate the properties of net income and net capital gains on
portfolio equity in relation to domestic and international business cycles. This ﬁrst stage checks
a key prerequisite of risk sharing, namely that net capital gains and net investment income on
international assets are countercyclical from the point of view of the domestic investor. In order
to facilitate risk sharing, international equity holdings should generate a higher return when the
domestic economy is performing less well vis-` a-vis the rest of the world. In a second stage, we
turn to consumption risk sharing by estimating a standard risk sharing coeﬃcient, which is then
augmented with country-speciﬁc cyclicality coeﬃcients of capital gains and income ﬂows. This
allows to assess whether the potential risk sharing characteristics of cross-border investment are
actually helpful in order to smooth consumption plans.
Our main ﬁnding is that, for risk sharing through portfolio equity holdings, the capital gain
channel appears to be more potent than the investment income channel. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
the risk sharing properties of equity generally hold better for industrial countries than for emerging
market economies. In somewhat more detail, our results can be grouped in three points:
• In the ﬁrst step, checking the cyclicality properties of capital gains and income, we ﬁnd
clear evidence that net capital gains are countercyclical and thus oﬀer a potential insurance
against idiosyncratic output shocks in the domestic economy. Such countercyclicality is found
for rates of net capital gains (which are essentially the diﬀerence between rates of capital gains
on foreign assets and liabilities) and for the overall size of net capital gains (as captured by
capital gains divided by domestic GDP). For the latter measure, the potential for insurance
has increased markedly over time, especially since the mid-1990s. For investment income
(dividends), results are more mixed, with limited evidence that they act as a buﬀer against
output shocks. The potential for risk sharing through portfolio equity is found to be existing
only for industrial countries.
• Reﬁning this ﬁrst-stage analysis, our analysis highlights two separate factors that may help
explain the increase in the potential role of capital gains as a hedge against country-speciﬁc
shocks, namely (i) a generalised decline in home bias and (ii) a deepening of stock markets
across most countries.
• Finally, in the second step, we ﬁnd that countries with more countercyclical net capital gains
on portfolio equity also experience more consumption risk sharing. When augmenting the
traditional risk sharing estimation with cyclicality measures of capital gains, we ﬁnd that
more countercyclical net capital gains also imply a higher degree of consumption smoothing.
This result again holds only for industrial countries, but not for emerging market economies.
This suggests that ﬁnancial globalisation leads to asymmetric beneﬁts globally: Industrial
9
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emerging market economies do not beneﬁt from such risk sharing.
One implication of these results concerns the eﬀect of exchange rate ﬂuctuations. Capital gains,
expressed in domestic currency of the investor, consist of a pure return-driven component and an
exchange rate-driven component. Available data do not allow to disentangle these two components
for a broad range of countries.1 However, the fact that our results on the risk sharing properties
of capital gains also hold on the liabilities side could suggest that currency movements do not play
a dominant role in our results. This is because equity liabilities, that is equity held by foreign
investors, are typically denominated in domestic currency and are hence not directly aﬀected by
exchange rate ﬂuctuations from a domestic viewpoint.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next Section discusses the motivation of the
paper in the context of the existing literature. Section 3 presents our dataset. The two legs of the
empirical analysis, namely the cyclicality of capital gains and income and its eﬀect on consumption
risk sharing, are presented in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Motivation and literature overview
By reviewing the role of capital gains as opposed to investment income as a risk sharing channel,
this paper stands at the cross-road of an established literature on consumption risk sharing and
a more recent strand of work on capital gains and valuation eﬀects. We brieﬂy review these two
strands of research and present our contributions to them.
2.1 Literature on consumption risk sharing
Several theoretical contributions elaborate the benchmark case for risk sharing through ﬁnancial
markets. Workhorse models have been developed, inter alia, by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992)
and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996). These model have a number of testable implications. One im-
plication is that cross-country correlations of consumption growth should be above cross-country
correlations of output growth. Another implication is that, within a given country, consumption
growth should be less volatile than output growth, as risk sharing should allow to smooth con-
sumption in the face of output shocks. Initial empirical work testing for these implications, for
instance by Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1995) and Lewis (1996), found the degree of risk sharing
to be very low or even negative. This feature of the data is known as the consumption correlation
puzzle (consumption growth less correlated than output growth, whereas it should be more highly
correlated according to theory) or quantity anomaly.2 Various extensions of this empirical work,
1Lane and Shambaugh (2007) provide empirical estimates that underline the important contribution of currency
movements to the valuation channel for a large panel of countries over 1990-2004.
2Several authors have extended the benchmark models to account for the quantity anomaly. Examples are Koll-
mann (1995) and Baxter and Crucini (1995), who build models with incomplete ﬁnancial markets, Chari et al. (2002),
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Tesar (1995), have largely conﬁrmed the limited degree of risk sharing.
More recent literature has partly nuanced this view and documented a marked increase of risk
sharing since the 1990s, even though estimates suggest that risk sharing remains far from perfect.
Artis and Hoﬀmann (2006) and Sørensen et al. (2007) estimate that risk sharing among industrial
countries has increased steadily throughout the 1990s and early-2000s. A similar increase in risk
sharing is found in Kose et al. (2007), but they also show that this result does not hold for
emerging market economies. Giannone and Reichlin (2006) ﬁnd an increase in risk sharing since
the early-1990s within the euro area. Sørensen et al. (2007) attribute it mainly to the growing
internationalisation of portfolios, i.e. the decline in home bias, in particular on equity holdings.
Fratzscher and Imbs (2007) conﬁrm this ﬁnding also for bilateral portfolio holdings.
Our paper mainly inscribes itself in the line of the recent empirical literature, as our results
conﬁrm a marked increase in the degree of international risk sharing, especially since the 1990s, i.e.
during the era of very strongly increasing international ﬁnancial integration. The main contribution
we add to this literature is our examination of the speciﬁc channels through which risk sharing
operates, as we examine the respective roles of income ﬂows (dividends) and capital gains on
international equity portfolios.
2.2 Literature on capital gains on international portfolios
Compared to the literature on risk sharing, the analysis of capital gains on international portfolios
is more limited and remains, so far, largely theoretical and mostly limited to studies of external
adjustment. Several authors hint at the theoretical implications of growing capital gains or valua-
tion eﬀects. Among those, Benigno (2006) and Hoﬀmann and Schmidt (2007) study, respectively,
the welfare implications and the monetary policy implications of valuation eﬀects. Lane (2001)
and Obstfeld (2004) argue that capital gains, even if unrealised, could help smooth output shocks
through wealth eﬀects. A series of authors, including Bems and Dedola (2006) Cavallo and Tille
(2006) Meredith (2007) also point to the potential role of valuation eﬀects in times of current
account adjustment, and highlight that these eﬀects could cushion the size of the exchange rate
correction that would typically come with such an adjustment.
While these contributions hint at the theoretical importance of capital gains, empirical work
is more scarce and by and large contained to the case of the United States. This is essentially
a matter of data availability, as only few countries publish oﬃcial estimates of capital gains on
international assets and liabilities. Curcuru, Dvorak and Warnock (2007) present a very detailed
review of developments in US capital gains and ﬁnd the return diﬀerential of assets over liabilities to
who consider nominal price rigidities, Kehoe and Perri (2002), who introduce imperfect enforceability of international
ﬁnancial contracts, and Stockman and Tesar (1995), who add a non-traded goods sector to the model. All of these
model extensions generate lower consumption correlations than in the benchmark case, although they usually do not
manage to explain why consumption correlations are even lower than output correlations.
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that country to contribute to, and even predict, external adjustment. Gourinchas (2007) discusses
empirical characteristics of valuation eﬀects for the United States and Australia, a second country
where detailed statistics are available. Schmitz (2007) uses a ﬁnancial market approach and ﬁnds
evidence for medium-term pro-cyclicality of capital gains on domestic stock markets, which can
consequently act as a smoothing device for domestic output ﬂuctuations.
We deliberately adopt a broader angle by examining capital gains for a broad cross-section of
countries.
3 Data compilation and empirical regularities
3.1 Data compilation
We build a comprehensive dataset for 35 countries with annual data between 1970 and 2005. In
contrast to most research in the area so far, we focus on a rather broad range of countries, including
18 industrial countries and 17 emerging market economies (EMEs).3 The country selection is
essentially driven by data quality and consistency requirements. We keep from an original sample
of over 100 countries only those series that display no unusual breaks and that have at least 10
years of continuously available data. Despite these strict selection criteria, the remaining sample
of 35 countries is a very representative part of the global economy, covering 92 percent of global
stock market capitalisation and of 94 percent of global cross-border holdings of portfolio equity.4
Data for investment income can be obtained either directly from statistical sources (we used
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics) or can be computed indirectly by applying dividend
yields from market index portfolios on outstanding stocks of foreign equity assets and liabilities.
Our dataset comprises data on the basis of both methodologies, i.e. direct measures of income and
indirect measures of income applying dividend returns (taken from Datastream) on outstanding
stocks (as deﬁned below).5 We compute both approaches to check for consistency, but use the
direct measures in our empirical estimations.








t are annual investment income ﬂows on equity assets and liabilities, iA
t and
3Some authors also include non-industrial countries in their sample, for instance Obstfeld (1994), Lewis (1999),
and Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2007). See Table 1 for the complete country list.
4These ﬁgures exclude data on Luxembourg, which has very sizeable cross-border equity holdings but is not
included in the dataset.




t are not directly observable, as that would require
information on the precise portfolio composition of assets and liabilities. A rough approximation for i
A
t is provided
by the dividend return on global stock markets, while a rough approximation for i
L
t is given by the dividend return
on the domestic stock market.
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t are the dividend returns on assets and liabilities, and At and Lt are the stocks of outstanding
assets and liabilities.
Data for capital gains on international assets are, by contrast, not directly available, with few
exceptions such as Australia and the United States. We therefore approximate net capital gains
on the basis of the following equation:6
KGt = [(At − At−1) − FlowAt] − [(Lt − Lt−1) − FlowLt] (2)
where FlowAt and FlowLt are capital outﬂows and inﬂows of portfolio equity.7 For these ﬂows, we
use data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. For outstanding stocks, we employ the
comprehensive External Wealth of Nations Mark II (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2007) dataset which
provides carefully compiled data on stocks of foreign assets and liabilities for the period 1970-2004.8
To extend our analysis as far as possible, we update this dataset with 2005 and 2006 observations
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.9
For example for foreign liabilities, one can calculate real rates of capital gains as follows:
kgL
t =
(Lit − Lit−1) − FlowLit
Lit−1
− πt (3)
where πt refers to the CPI inﬂation rate. The rate of net capital gains is deﬁned as the diﬀerential
between the rate of capital gains on foreign assets and the rate of capital gains on foreign liabilities.
Our dataset also includes net total returns, which are equal to the sum of net income ﬂows and
net capital gains:
RETt = INCt + KGt (4)
On a more general level, also reinvested earnings and undistributed proﬁts are an important
part of ﬁnancial returns. Retained earnings can potentially be an important driver of capital gains,
as they increase the market value of a company listed on the stock market.10
We closely scrutinise these data with regard to outliers and potential breaks. However, data
on portfolio equity are rather reliable and robust which was also an essential reason for us to focus
6See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) for a derivation of the associated accounting framework.
7The US Bureau of Economic Analysis uses an equivalent approach - employing stocks and ﬂows data - to calculate
capital gains on the US international investment positions. These total capital gains, or valuation adjustments in the
BEA terminology, are further broken down into price, exchange rate and other changes.
8See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for problems associated with calculating capital gains using external positions
data.
9To compute these updates, we also check consistency between the EWN II and the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics (IFS) data. Speciﬁcally, the newer IFS data are used only if both sources indicate similar magnitudes for
the years 2002-2003.
10The statistical treatment of retained earnings diﬀers across investment categories. While they are not recorded
as income ﬂows for portfolio equity, the category of assets under investigation in this paper, they are estimated and
recorded as income ﬂows for foreign direct investment.
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form are US-dollar based. We transform them using IFS data on bilateral spot exchange rates. It
is crucial for this calculation to employ year-end exchange rates for stock data and yearly average
rates for ﬂow data.
Our dataset also contains the cyclical component of real GDP growth and of real private con-
sumption growth. Real GDP and real private consumption data are taken from diﬀerent sources, in-
cluding the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and World Economic Outlook and the OECD’s
Quarterly National Accounts. Where possible, we computed growth rates on the basis of fourth-
quarter data (e.g., the growth rate for 2006 compares 2006Q4 with 2005Q4 data) rather than yearly
average growth rates as conventionally done. This is in our view essential to ensure consistency
with the income and capital gains data, which are derived from end-of-year outstanding stocks.
We apply the same method to the calcualtion of CPI inﬂation rates. We use an HP-ﬁlter to obtain
the cyclical components of GDP and consumption growth.11 For our analysis, we also need data
on real GDP growth in the rest of the world. To generate this rate carefully, we do not rely on
global GDP growth ﬁgures, but compute rest-of-the-world GDP growth for each country individu-
ally, using GDP levels in US dollar terms as weights. Our dataset is completed with stock market
capitalisation data from Datastream.
3.2 Some empirical regularities from our dataset
Our dataset allows to present some ﬁrst insights in the development of international equity holdings
and the associated income ﬂows and capital gains. To start with, the data conﬁrm the very rapid
increase in international ﬁnancial integration over the past decades, as already documented in
the literature (see e.g. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2005 and Obstfeld, 2004). Conventionally such
integration is measured by the global stock of cross-border ﬁnancial holdings as a share of global
GDP. For the asset category under investigation in this paper, i.e. portfolio equity, this ratio
has increased from around 2 percent in the 1970s to over 25 percent in 2005, with a particular
acceleration during the 1990s (Figure 1, solid line). Also in comparison to global stock market
capitalisation, international holdings of portfolio equity have increased strongly, from around 10
percent in the 1970s to 25 percent today (Figure 1, dashed line). This suggests a fundamental
change in investment patterns, with a growing share of equity investment held across borders.
Not surprisingly, this increase in cross-border holdings of international portfolio equity has
translated into larger capital gains and income ﬂows. For the 35 countries in the sample, gross
income ﬂows averaged over 0.5 percent of GDP in 2005, compared to 0.2 percent in the 1970s.
Capital gains have also increased rapidly and stood on average at 4.5 percent of GDP in 2005 up
from around 0.5 percent in the 1970s (Figure 2). An interesting feature of the data is that capital
gains are, on average, far higher than investment income. In 2005, capital gains were roughly
11In line with Ravn and Uhlig (2002), we set the smoothing parameter λ at 6.25 for our annual data.
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potentially play a much more important role than income ﬂows as a channel for income smoothing.
Yet, this ﬁrst impression could potentially be misleading: income ﬂows generate an immediate
transfer of resources that can be used one-for-one for consumption or investment purposes, whereas
capital gains generate only a change in wealth and have therefore only an indirect impact on
consumption through wealth eﬀects. The relative importance of capital gains vis-` a-vis income
ﬂows for income smoothing purposes can therefore not be directly read from Figure 2, but should
be determined on the basis of the empirical analysis below.
It is interesting to compare international capital gains with domestic capital gains. In principle,
it could be that the capital gains on international portfolios are completely dwarfed by the gains
that equity investors make on their domestic portfolios. Figure 3 shows that this is not the case. In
2005, capital gains on international portfolio holdings constituted nearly half of the capital gains
on domestic equity markets, while they were only around 15 percent of domestic capital gains in
the 1970s. Thus, we observe an indication for an increase in the relative importance of capital gains
on international investment positions.
Finally, we present some country-speciﬁc data in Table 1, showing average values over the period
2001-2005. The table includes ﬁgures for overall portfolio equity assets and liabilities, capital gains
and income ﬂows (in absolute value), market capitalisation on the domestic equity markets (MCAP
) and measures of home bias of domestic investors (HB) as well as home bias of foreign investors
with regard to the country concerned (HBW).12 The table points to considerable divergence
within the sample. International equity assets, for instance, range from close to 0 percent of GDP
in India and Russia to 123 percent of GDP in Singapore. Reﬂecting these diﬀerences in cross-border
investment, also the size of capital gains and income ﬂows are very diﬀerent across the sample. For
most countries, though, the general pattern remains that capital gains are clearly above income
ﬂows.
The Table also highlights diﬀerences between country groupings, in particular industrial versus
emerging market economies. Taking simple averages across the countries in the sample, interna-
tional equity asset holdings represent almost 30 percent of GDP in industrial countries against 11
percent in emerging market economies. A similar picture emerges on the liabilities side. In line
with this, capital gains on equity holdings are far more important in industrial countries, where
they represent over 4 percent of GDP, against 2.5 percent of GDP for emerging markets.
4 The cyclicality of capital gains and income ﬂows
As a ﬁrst step of our risk sharing analysis, we examine the cyclical properties of capital gains and
income ﬂows on portfolio equity. This allows to check for a key prerequisite of risk sharing, namely
12Precise deﬁnitions of these two home bias measures are provided in Section 4.4.
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sign and magnitude of the reaction of capital gains and net income to swings in domestic relative
to global output. We also analyse developments over time and explore whether the potential for
risk sharing is inﬂuenced by the degree of home bias in international portfolios as well as the depth
of ﬁnancial markets.
4.1 Estimation strategy
The ﬁrst step of the empirical analysis consists of estimating the co-movement between output
shocks, on the one hand, and capital gains and income ﬂows, on the other hand. Consider the
case of net capital gains: The mechanism of international risk-sharing implies that a country
experiencing a positive shock to its output (relative to the rest of the world) would incur net
capital losses. Conversely, an economy that is relatively underperforming should receive net capital
gains. To check this empirically, we estimate a panel regression based on the following equation:
kgit = αi + δt + γ(yit − y∗
it) + uit (5)
where kgit are net capital gains and yit − y∗
it is the diﬀerence between domestic and foreign real
GDP growth, for a given country i and year t. Equivalent equations are estimated for net income
incit as well as for total returns, retit, i.e. the sum of capital gains and net income. We both follow
Lane (2001) and Schmitz (2007) who use implied yield and capital gains rates, respectively, but
we also opt for using actual levels of capital gains and investment income in order to get a clear
picture about wealth and welfare eﬀects through international investment.
Thus, we use two diﬀerent methods for the left-hand side variable. First as also used by Curcuru
et al. (2007) or Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), we use implied real rates of returns (or capital gains)
as calculated in equation (3). This allows to test whether these implied rates exhibit the necessary
cyclical properties to provide international risk sharing. However, it does not provide information
on the size of the capital gains or income ﬂows. We therefore employ a complementary method that
consists of scaling returns by domestic GDP. This second measure allows to simultaneously explore
whether returns exhibit the necessary cyclical properties and whether they are of suﬃciently large
size to generate income or wealth eﬀects.
The coeﬃcient γ can be interpreted as a cyclicality coeﬃcient. It gives a ﬁrst idea whether
international risk sharing is functioning, that is whether net capital gains can provide an insurance
against idiosyncratic output shocks. To allow risk sharing, the coeﬃcient should be negative, i.e.
higher growth domestically should generate a net capital loss or a net income loss.
The interpretation of this cyclicality coeﬃcient depends crucially on the method we use. By
using implied rates of returns on foreign assets and liabilities, we test whether they have the correct
sign to provide for risk sharing. By expressing returns as a ratio to GDP, we assess both the sign
and the size of the returns. This allows to gauge the eﬀect of ﬁnancial globalisation on international
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way. For instance, a coeﬃcient of -1 would imply that every 1 percentage point negative shock to
GDP generates a counterbalancing return of 1 percent of GDP. The total absence of risk sharing
would imply a coeﬃcient of 0. A positive coeﬃcient would imply that capital gains or income
actually worsen the potential for risk sharing.
The estimation includes country ﬁxed eﬀects αi and time ﬁxed eﬀects δt so as to focus on the
idiosyncratic part of GDP growth only. For both domestic and foreign growth rates, we use cyclical
components so as to avoid capturing structural diﬀerences in growth levels.13 This corresponds to
theoretical concept of risk sharing as an insurance against volatility of output, not insurance against
diﬀerent average growth levels.
Our estimation also allows to examine whether the countercyclical behaviour of capital ﬂows
derives mainly from the asset or from the liabilities side. To do so, we disentangle equation (5) in
the following asset and liability components:
kgL
it = αi + δt + γLyit + uit (6)
kgA
it = αi + γAy∗
it + uit (7)
where we again employ the two methods for measuring capital gains, that is by the implied rates
of return and by scaling to domestic GDP. We estimate speciﬁcations (6) and (7) with ﬁrst-order
autoregressive disturbances (in order to adjust for persistence and auto-correlation in the error
term) as well as heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Capital gains on foreign liabilities,
which are losses to domestic residents and gains to foreign investors, need to be pro-cyclical in
order to generate risk-sharing, and we thus expect γL to be positive. Extending this reasoning to
the rest of the world implies that capital gains on foreign assets should be pro-cyclical with GDP
growth of the rest of the world, i.e. we expect also γA to have a positive sign.14 In the same way
we run estimations for income ﬂows and total investment returns.
4.2 Overall results
Starting with the estimation of rates of net capital gains, we ﬁnd evidence that those act in a
countercyclical way. The estimated cyclicality coeﬃcient (-1.4) has the expected negative sign and
is signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level (Table 2). Hence an increase in the cyclical component of
domestic real GDP growth relative to the rest of the world co-moves negatively with the real rate
13We use the residual of GDP growth obtained from an HP-ﬁlter with a λ = 6.25. This allows for focusing on the
cyclical component of GDP growth rates. See Section 3.1 for details on the computation of GDP growth rates.
14As we evaluate capital gains in domestic currency this can of course only hold if exchange rate movements do
not distort the relation notably.
We omit time ﬁxed eﬀects in the estimation as we are now explicitly interested in global shocks.
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The result does not hold for investment income, as the coeﬃcient has the desired sign but is
not statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that net income on portfolio equity, on average, does not
have the required countercyclical properties to act as a channel for risk sharing. One explanation
of this result could be the corporate ﬁnance motivations behind dividend distribution, in particular
the desire of ﬁrms to keep dividends relatively constant in the presence of ﬂuctuations in proﬁts.
For the rate of total returns (capital gains plus income), the estimated coeﬃcient is again negative
and signiﬁcant (at the 10% level), implying that the capital gains channel dominates the investment
income channel in this case.
Separating out the liability and the asset sides, we ﬁnd rates of capital gains on the liabilities
side to co-move with GDP growth with a coeﬃcient of 1.7 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). This
is consistent with the assumption in theoretical frameworks (see e.g. Davis, Nalewaik and Willen,
2001) that domestic equity market returns tend to be procyclical. This result has the property
of risk-sharing being “created”from within the economy, that is through domestic stock markets.
Also for the asset side, capital gains have the expected relation, as they positively co-move with
GDP growth in the rest of the world, with a coeﬃcient of 3.3 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level).15
This full set of results remains largely unchanged, but more signiﬁcant, when we perform es-
timations on the returns scaled by GDP. Speciﬁcally, an increase of one percentage point in the
GDP growth diﬀerential co-moves with a net capital loss of 0.15 percent of GDP (Table 3, Panel A,
signiﬁcant at the 1% level). This implies a wealth transfer of 0.15 percent of GDP to the rest of the
world when domestic GDP growth is increasing by one percentage point relative to the rest of the
world. This does not hold for income ﬂows, but for total returns where the estimated coeﬃcient is
negative and signiﬁcant (-0.2).
Results for assets and liabilities are also very similar for this scaling method: for the liabilities
side, we ﬁnd capital gains to co-move with GDP growth with a coeﬃcient of 0.18 (signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level). Also for the asset side, capital gains have the expected relation that is required
for risk sharing, as they positively co-move with rest of the world-GDP growth, with a coeﬃcient
of 0.4 (signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). In contrast to Table 2, we do not see a signiﬁcant positive
coeﬃcient on the liability side for total returns. This is probably driven by the signiﬁcantly negative
cyclicality coeﬃcient on investment income outﬂows.
As a robustness check, we perform this last set of estimations again, adding two control variables,
a time trend and total ﬁnancial holdings (Table 3, Panels B and C). These two control variables
are important as their omission could create a bias in our estimation results. This is particularly
true because capital gains and income ﬂows, expressed as a ratio to GDP, have increased markedly
over time, in line with holdings of foreign equity assets and liabilities. The relation between capital
gains and the business cycle may therefore be instable over time. As for the time trend, we
15The same mechanism also holds for the total returns. The coeﬃcients on investment income, by contrast, are
found to be insigniﬁcant on the asset side, whereas positive and signiﬁcant on the liability side.
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gains have increased with time. Importantly, however, the estimated cyclicality coeﬃcients remain
largely unaﬀected, as their signiﬁcance remains unchanged and their size changes only marginally.
Likewise, the inclusion of foreign equity assets and liabilities as a control variable does not aﬀect
our estimation results substantially.
Therefore, in conclusion, employing the control variables does not change our overall results
notably. This is also consistent with the fact that our results in particular for capital gains and
total returns are very much alike regardless of the method used.
Finally, we rerun the regressions for a number of subgroups, in particular industrial countries,
euro area countries, and emerging market economies (Table 4 and Table 5). In Table 4, net capital
gains have the correct and signiﬁcant signs only for the overall estimations, whereas they are
signiﬁcant for both the overall sample and industrial countries, when scaled by GDP (in Table 5).
For emerging markets, we do not observe signiﬁcant cyclicality coeﬃcients on net capital gains.
This might be severe for these countries as their output volatility tends to be much higher, and
consequently beneﬁts from ﬁnancial integration could be very helpful in order to stabilise these
economies.
By and large, we crucially ﬁnd that international risk-sharing through cross-border equity seems
feasible as cyclical, idiosyncratic ﬂuctuations in GDP growth rates are at least partly oﬀ-set by net
capital gains on foreign equity investment positions. However, variations in net income ﬂows do
not seem to be related in any signiﬁcant way to output shocks, suggesting that the potential for
consumption smoothing through such ﬂows is severely limited.
4.3 Developments in cyclicality over time
With growing ﬁnancial integration, it seems natural that the behaviour of capital gains and income
ﬂows has changed over time. To explore such changes over time, we perform, as a ﬁrst check, esti-
mations over a subsample running from 1993 to 2005, covering the years of enhanced international
ﬁnancial integration as observed above.
Table 4 reports results based on implied rates of capital gains. The cyclicality coeﬃcient γ
turns out to be modestly higher in the subsample 1993-2005 than for the full sample. In particular
the coeﬃcient on foreign assets increased from 3.3 to 6.2 and the coeﬃcient on net capital gains
changes from -1.4 to -1.8. This suggest that risk sharing possibilities have improved in the last
decade.
The results for capital gains scaled to GDP are reported in Table 5. Also for this measure,
there has been a marked increase in the cyclicality coeﬃcient throughout the sample. For the full
set of countries, the coeﬃcient increases (in absolute terms) from -0.15 over the whole sample to
-0.21 over the more recent sub-sample. Similar results hold for assets and liabilities separately, as
well as for the diﬀerent country groupings (in particular industrial countries).
19
ECB
Working Paper Series No 938
September 2008For a more reﬁned analysis of trends over time, we run a speciﬁcation where the cyclicality
coeﬃcient γt is allowed to change over time. We do so by re-running the regressions over rolling
ﬁve year-periods.16 The resulting γ-coeﬃcients are reported in Figures 4 and 5.17 The results
conﬁrm that the cyclicality of capital gains has changed markedly over time, and in particular that
the average response of those gains to output shocks has increased over time. Using the implied
rates of capital gains, one can detect a declining trend in the γ-coeﬃcient for the full sample of
countries (Figure 4, Panel A). Using GDP as a scaling factor, the cyclicality coeﬃcient on net
capital gains has reached unprecedented high negative values after 1997, reﬂecting developments in
the industrial countries, where - in contrast to the previous method - the γ-coeﬃcient has moved
close to -1 towards the end of the sample (Figure 5, Panel B).
Analysing the role of assets and liabilities separately, the increase in the cyclicality coeﬃcient
can be observed on both sides. Developments on the foreign liability side (Panel B of Figures
4 and 5) show a gradual increase in the pro-cyclicality of portfolio equity. Also on the side of
foreign assets (Panel C of Figures 4 and 5), the co-movement with rest-of-the-world GDP growth
has strengthened remarkably. Furthermore, the distinction between assets and liabilities conﬁrms
that the increasing cyclical behaviour of capital gains is more pronounced for industrial countries
than for emerging market economies.
Repeating this exercise for investment income, we ﬁnd very diﬀerent results (see Figure 6 for
implied income yields and Figure 7 for income scaled to GDP). Overall, net investment income
(Panel A) was broadly countercyclical until the 1990s, although at very low levels. After that,
the coeﬃcients have moved even closer to zero, suggesting that barely any co-movement has taken
place. In Figure 7, we actually see for industrial countries a trend towards very limited pro-
cyclicality of net income ﬂows after 2000, whereas counter-cyclicality is observable for emerging
markets. Separate results on assets and liabilities (Panels B and C) conﬁrm that coeﬃcients are
very small, without clear trends over time.
4.4 Explaining the cyclical properties of capital gains
The next step of our empirical exercise is to test whether variations in home bias and in ﬁnancial
market depth help explain the cyclical properties of the ratio of net capital gains to GDP. To do so,
we rerun estimations (5) - (7), imposing a structure on γ that depends on home bias and ﬁnancial
deepening.18 We let
γ = γ0 + γ1HBit + γ2HB∗
it + γ3MCAPit + γ4MCAP∗
it (8)
16These estimations are pooled to avoid possible distortions to the estimates arising from the very short time spans.
17In the ﬁgures, the γt coeﬃcient plotted for a given year t corresponds to an estimate over the ﬁve-year period
between t − 4 and t. For presentational purposes, the coeﬃcients are smoothed using the Lowess-method with a
bandwidth of 0.8.
18In these estimations we scale capital gains by GDP in order to explicitly capture the eﬀect of the increasing
magnitude of international ﬁnancial markets.
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it are the home bias of the domestic economy and the rest of the world,
respectively, and MCAPit and MCAP∗
it refer to domestic and world stock market capitalisation
relative to domestic and world GDP. Obviously, we impose a structure containing domestic variables
for capital gains on foreign liabilities estimations and global variables for the foreign asset side. For
the estimation, home bias in international equity is measured following French and Poterba (1991)
as:







where Ait is the foreign asset position in portfolio equity and Wit equals MCAPit + Ait − Lit,
corresponding to domestic wealth in terms of portfolio equity. Hence, if HBit equals zero there is
no home bias in the investment strategy of the investing country, i.e. country i’s investment in its
own stock market is in line with the share of the domestic to the global stock market. Conversely,
we deﬁne a somewhat less conventionally used measure, the international home bias from country
i’s perspective (i.e. the aggregate home bias of the rest of the world on its investment in country
i), as:
HB∗




t − Wit) ∗ MCAPit
(10)
where WW
t represents global wealth in terms of portfolio equity and is computed as the sum of all
Wit in our sample, that is global wealth in terms of portfolio equity.
Table 6 presents the estimation results. The ﬁrst row shows that the cyclicality of capital
gains on foreign equity liabilities has a highly signiﬁcant γL-coeﬃcient of more than unity, but
international home bias has a negative eﬀect on the procyclicality of the foreign liability side. The
second row highlights that, if we additionally include domestic stock market capitalisation (as a
proxy for ﬁnancial deepening), results are again very signiﬁcant: A one percentage point increase
in the stock market to GDP ratio increases the cyclicality coeﬃcient by 0.01.19
Regarding capital gains on foreign assets we impose a structure with equivalent variables (third
and fourth rows). These are the home bias when investing abroad as well as global stock market
capitalisation. Both variables are signiﬁcant with coeﬃcients of about -1 for home bias and 2.4
for global stock market capitalisation, again suggesting that ﬁnancial deepening is beneﬁcial for
international risk-sharing.
Finally we impose the same structure on the estimation of γ for net capital gains (ﬁfth and
sixth rows). Both in the estimation with and without stock market capitalisation, the estimated
coeﬃcient γ suggests counter-cyclicality with a coeﬃcient close to -1. The structural variables are
not signiﬁcant in this estimation suggesting that they oﬀ-set each other.
19This result is in line with Schmitz (2007), who uses a diﬀerent methodology showing that the procyclicality of
domestic stock markets increases with stock market capitalisation.
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hamper international risk-sharing.
5 Consumption risk sharing
5.1 Overall empirical evidence
After having analysed the cyclicality of capital gains and income, we turn to evaluate actual risk
sharing in terms of consumption. Following Lewis (1996), we are interested in determining to what
extent consumption paths are buﬀered from output shocks. As described above ﬁndings in the
literature suggests a rather low degree of risk sharing. Our empirical strategy in order to evaluate
the extent of consumption smoothing involves the standard risk sharing equation:
cit = δt + βyit + uit (11)
where cit and yit are the cyclical components of consumption and output growth, respectively. It
is crucial to include time ﬁxed eﬀects (δt) in order to isolate the idiosyncratic parts of consumption
and output growth.20 Time ﬁxed eﬀects control for global shocks that are uninsurable risks. The
coeﬃcient β measures the co-movement of the two. In a world of perfect risk sharing β should
be equal to zero, such that consumption paths are completely buﬀered against domestic output
ﬂuctuations. The consumption correlations puzzle refers to the fact that estimates of β are still large
and, in some estimates, even above 1. Corsetti, Dedola and Leduc (2007) show that accounting for
terms of trade changes, for example due to productivity shocks, alters the value of the coeﬃcient
associated with perfect risk sharing, i.e. it should no longer be equal to zero. Bearing this fact in
mind, we are interested to observe in our empirical set-up, in line with Sørensen et al. (2007) and
Fratzscher and Imbs (2007), how the risk sharing coeﬃcient changes once we control for increased
ﬁnancial integration and the cyclicality of capital gains and investment income ﬂows.
Considering the standard risk sharing equation over the full time period from 1971 to 2005 (see
Table 7, Panel A), we ﬁnd values for β to be high and signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (0.73 for
the complete sample), suggesting that consumption risk sharing is not perfect. Strikingly estimates
for industrial countries (0.50) are considerably lower than for emerging markets (0.90) - a ﬁnding
consistent with Kose et al. (2007) who ﬁnd consumption smoothing to work more eﬀectively for
industrial than for emerging market economies.21
Recent empirical work (e.g. Sørensen et al., 2007, Fratzscher and Imbs, 2007) augments the
consumption risk sharing equation with interaction terms in order to impose a structure on the β
coeﬃcient. Speciﬁcally they introduce holdings of foreign assets and liabilities (as de facto measures
20Employing country ﬁxed eﬀects does not have a signiﬁcant impact in this estimation as we use cyclical components.
21For consistency reasons we only include observations of the years that were available for the cyclicality analysis
of net capital gains.
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diﬀerent asset classes (e.g. portfolio equity, FDI etc.). We verify these results for our dataset by
running run equation (11) once more with the imposed structure
β = β1 + β2FOEQit (12)
where FOEQit measures the sum of foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities divided by nominal
GDP (Panel B). Augmenting with this speciﬁc measure of ﬁnancial openness, we observe for the
subgroup of industrial countries a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect (indicated by a coeﬃcient of -0.5,
signiﬁcant at the 1% level) of de facto portfolio equity integration on consumption risk sharing (as
also identiﬁed by Sørensen et al., 2007). For emerging market economies, however, no evidence for
a beneﬁcial eﬀect of cross-border investments is found (in line with Kose et al., 2007).
While these estimations reproduce results that have already been identiﬁed in the literature
our main contribution to the risk sharing literature is to explicitly introduce the potential channels
of international risk-sharing as identiﬁed above: the capital gains channel and income ﬂows. In
line with the analysis of this paper we focus on portfolio equity investments. Thus, we impose for
example the following structure on the risk sharing coeﬃcient:
β = β1 + β2 c γkg (13)
where c γkg are the set of country-by-country cyclicality estimates of net capital gains from the
portfolio equity category. We estimate these in a ﬁrst step by running the country-by-country
equivalent speciﬁcations of (5) to (7). Using the cyclicality coeﬃcients in the augmentation of the
traditional risk sharing equation allows us to observe if countries that exhibit for international risk
sharing desirable cyclicality patterns, are also the countries with improved consumption risk sharing
properties.22 We also run speciﬁcation with the cyclicality estimations on capital gains on assets
and liabilities separately. In other speciﬁcations we use the coeﬃcients on net investment income
to investigate the impact of dividend payments and total returns to examine the joint impact of
capital gains and dividends.23 Regarding net capital gains and income ﬂows, we expect β2 to have a
positive sign, i.e. to bring the overall risk sharing coeﬃcient closer to 0, if the associated cyclicality
coeﬃcients are negative. In line with analysis of the previous section we expect a negative sign on
β2 for the asset and liability side estimations.
Our results in Table 7 shows that we ﬁnd the expected coeﬃcients for the overall sample and
industrial countries. This holds for both the cyclicality coeﬃcients on net capital gains (Panel C)
as well as for capital gains on foreign assets or liabilities (Panel D and E, respectively). Hence,
we have established that countries with the required cyclical properties regarding capital gains
22The cyclicality estimates are time invariant for each country. We weight by the in the country-by-country
estimation obtained t-statistics.
23We use the cyclicality coeﬃcients from the speciﬁcation where capital gains are measured as a ratios to GDP.
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ﬁnd signiﬁcant β2-coeﬃcients in the opposite direction, whereas no signiﬁcant results are found for
emerging markets (except for the coeﬃcient on capital gains on foreign assets).
As a next step we consider the cyclical properties of net investment income as a driver of con-
sumption risk sharing. Results on β2 suggest for the overall and industrial sample that countries
with more counter-cyclical net investment income ﬂows also experience more consumption smooth-
ing (Panel F). Coeﬃcients are less signiﬁcant than the ones for net capital gains, however. Also, we
should bear in mind that the overall panel results in the previous section did not indicate counter-
cyclicality for net investment income ﬂows. For the coeﬃcients on total returns on portfolio equity
we do not observe a a positive impact on international risk sharing (Panel G).
Overall, one can infer from this analysis that industrial countries beneﬁt from ﬁnancial glob-
alisation in terms of improved risk sharing, whereas emerging markets do not. This ﬁnding holds
both in our ﬁrst-step cyclicality analysis as well as in the consumption risk sharing analysis.24
5.2 Estimating risk sharing over time
The next step in the analysis is the exploration of possible trends over time. We rerun the regres-
sions for the time period from 1993 - 2005 in order to capture the recent time period of ﬁnancial
globalisation.25 Noticeably, for our overall sample there is an improvement in international risk-
sharing (Table 8, Panel A): The overall coeﬃcient decreases from 0.73 to 0.70. The improvement
is most pronounced for industrial countries with a coeﬃcient of 0.29 (against 0.50 for the full time
period) and even more so for the euro area countries with a value of 0.24 (against 0.58). For
emerging markets, on the other hand, even a small decline from 0.90 to 0.91 can be observed.
Regarding the channels of risk sharing, we ﬁnd less evidence compared to the full time period.
The overall coeﬃcient on β2 is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level, whereas it is not signiﬁcant for
industrial countries. Also the coeﬃcients for investment income ﬂows are not signiﬁcant for this
time period. Hence, for example among industrial countries, the observed increased consumption
risk sharing is not signiﬁcantly higher for countries with more counter-cyclical net capital gains.
However, in Table 5, we observed improved counter-cyclicality of net capital gains for this group.
Thus, either diﬀerences among industrial countries with regard to their cyclicality patterns have
diminished or other cross-country diﬀerences play a more important role for consumption risk
sharing.
24A similar pattern is found in the literature on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial globalisation on output growth, where e.g.
Kose et al. (2006) suggest that countries need to pass a certain threshold in their development in order to beneﬁt
from ﬁnancial globalisation.
25Accordingly, we estimate the country-by-country cyclicality coeﬃcients for the period 1993-2005
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This paper has reviewed one of the real economy implications of growing ﬁnancial integration,
namely international risk sharing. The basic intuition behind risk sharing through ﬁnancial markets
is that international portfolio diversiﬁcation helps to reduce volatility on investment returns, which
in turn helps smooth variations in income and in consumption across countries.
The main question of interest in this paper was to understand whether such risk sharing is
functioning in practice, and, if so, through which channels. We have examined speciﬁcally the role
of capital gains versus that of income on international securities, with a focus on portfolio equity
for both theoretical reasons and practical reasons.
The dataset allows to check whether capital gains and income help smooth income in the
face of idiosyncratic output shocks. Our empirical strategy has proceeded in two stages: ﬁrst, do
idiosyncratic output shocks translate into net capital gains and income in the desired direction?
Second, do the cyclicality patterns of investment returns have a signiﬁcant impact on consumption
risk sharing? Overall we ﬁnd net capital gains to have the required countercyclical properties
in the ﬁrst stage of the analysis and also to have an impact on consumption risk sharing in the
second stage. For income ﬂows, however, results are less promising, as coeﬃcients on income ﬂows
are insigniﬁcant for most speciﬁcations. This may reﬂect the preference of ﬁrms to keep dividend
streams relatively constant in the presence of ﬂuctuations in their proﬁts.
Extensions of this empirical analysis have also allowed to investigate the development of risk
sharing over time. Overall, we ﬁnd that the reaction of capital gains to idiosyncratic output shocks
has increased over time. In the 1970s, net capital gains on international equity hardly moved in
response to output shocks, whereas in the 2000s the coeﬃcient has come close to values that would
be compatible with perfect risk sharing properties.
This tendency towards a greater potential for risk sharing through capital gains seems unam-
biguously linked with the process of ﬁnancial globalisation, a process that has accelerated markedly
throughout the 1990s and early-2000s. We argue that their are conceptually two diﬀerent levers
through which ﬁnancial globalisation may enhance risk sharing: ﬁrst, a decline in home bias, i.e.
a growing share of international security holdings in investor portfolios, and second, a deepening
of ﬁnancial markets, i.e. a growing potential to claim a country’s future output through ﬁnancial
instruments.
A ﬁnal outcome of our empirical analysis is that results usually hold best for industrial countries.
For emerging market economies, we ﬁnd only very limited evidence for risk sharing behaviour
through capital gains on international portfolio holdings. Capital gains are small and do not react
in any signiﬁcant way to output shocks; also, their impact on consumption seems to be insigniﬁcant.
The most straightforward explanation for this negative result would be that ﬁnancial markets in
emerging market economies, especially the equity securities market that we examine in this paper,
are on average too small to act as channel for consumption risk sharing.
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September 2008Finally, various extensions of our work are possible. One such extension would be to repeat the
exercise for diﬀerent types of asset holdings, in particular foreign direct investment and debt. This
would allow to form a more complete picture of risk sharing through international capital markets,
but such an exercise would run into signiﬁcant data problems, given that reliable estimates of
capital gains on these other asset categories are diﬃcult to construct. Another avenue for further
reﬁnement would be to examine the behaviour of bilateral risk sharing and the role of bilateral
security holdings therein. More broadly, the dataset we have constructed may be useful to examine
a range of empirical questions on international capital gains, such as the asset price implications
that have been examined by Gourinchas and Rey (2007a) for the US case.
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Note: Smoothed using Lowess−method with a bandwidth of 0.8.
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September 2008Assets Liabilities Net On assets On liabilities of residents of foreigners
Australia 17.5 24.5 1.8 1.3 2.9 0.4 92.6 79.1 70.0
Austria 17.6 12.3 2.5 3.3 2.3 0.0 20.9 28.0 29.3
Canada 35.1 20.5 5.4 10.9 5.5 0.5 78.4 58.2 68.5
Finland 23.6 70.7 23.4 3.3 25.4 1.1 94.2 46.3 17.5
France 18.9 28.7 2.5 2.5 5.1 .. 65.0 64.3 48.4
Germany 24.9 14.4 0.7 4.1 3.7 0.3 35.7 44.0 52.6
Iceland 36.6 6.0 4.9 3.6 1.8 0.2 .. .. ..
Italy 22.3 11.0 1.0 2.4 2.2 0.3 39.1 53.9 67.7
Japan 6.7 14.2 2.3 1.1 3.1 0.1 66.7 87.2 73.7
Netherlands 66.7 67.8 5.0 11.6 10.9 0.7 97.9 28.3 18.2
New Zealand 17.0 10.5 2.5 2.4 1.0 0.3 35.4 59.4 68.1
Norway 31.4 10.9 2.3 2.9 2.2 .. 41.3 44.8 67.9
Portugal 7.7 21.5 1.9 0.6 2.5 0.3 37.9 65.6 35.7
Spain 10.3 21.7 2.1 1.6 3.5 0.3 51.1 73.4 51.8
Sweden 48.0 32.4 4.4 8.0 11.4 0.2 79.5 48.8 54.1
Switzerland 94.3 131.6 8.3 14.9 22.6 0.3 213.5 44.8 29.4
United Kingdom 39.7 47.8 2.3 6.3 7.9 0.3 123.4 62.2 52.3
United States 18.9 16.1 1.3 3.5 2.3 0.2 100.7 67.3 63.1
Average (industrial) 29.9 32.1 4.2 4.7 6.6 0.3 74.9 56.3 50.2
Argentina 8.1 1.2 1.8 2.3 0.0 0.0 10.4 50.5 85.9
Brazil 1.3 10.2 1.9 0.0 1.9 0.3 35.1 93.3 64.4
Chile 19.9 5.1 0.7 1.4 0.6 0.1 79.6 78.2 92.9
China 0.4 2.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 .. 14.7 96.4 83.8
Czech Republic 3.4 6.7 0.7 0.8 1.1 0.1 19.5 77.8 60.1
Estonia 3.0 10.4 2.5 0.6 2.9 0.2 .. .. ..
Hungary 0.5 8.3 1.4 0.1 1.8 0.1 21.6 95.0 57.9
India 0.1 6.4 .. .. 1.0 0.3 28.9 99.1 71.6
Israel 6.4 22.6 4.8 0.8 6.0 0.2 41.8 73.1 42.9
Korea 1.3 20.2 1.7 0.2 4.5 0.2 41.7 93.6 48.9
Latvia 0.7 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. ..
Lithuania 0.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. .. ..
Peru 5.5 4.7 0.5 0.3 0.3 .. 17.8 69.1 67.8
Philippines 1.4 4.9 0.8 0.3 1.1 0.0 26.4 93.1 78.9
Russia 0.0 12.8 4.1 0.0 4.3 0.3 35.8 99.4 57.7
Singapore 123.6 50.5 14.9 21.9 7.5 .. 128.9 37.6 58.5
South Africa 27.8 21.3 3.1 3.7 2.4 0.1 82.1 66.9 72.3
Average (EMEs) 11.3 11.4 2.5 2.0 2.2 0.1 41.7 80.0 67.3
Average (All) 21.4 22.1 3.4 3.5 4.5 0.2 59.9 66.2 57.3
Notes: (a) Value of 0 indicates no home bias. 
Table 1: International portfolio equity holdings, key characteristics by country
(Average values over the period 2001-2005)
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(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Expected sign + + –
Capital gains, liabilities    1.70 (0.64)***
Capital gains, assets   3.30 (0.91)***
Capital gains, net   -1.41 (0.71)*
Income, liabilities   0.20 (0.09)**
Income, assets   -0.33 (0.49)
Income, net   -0.19 (0.12)
Total return, liabilities   1.76 (0.79)**
Total return, assets  3.78 (1.31) ***
Total return, net   -1.50 (0.80))*
Table 2: Cyclicality of capital gains, income and returns on international portfolio holdings
(Estimated regression coefficients, dependent variables: implied real rates of return )
Notes: The dependent variables are the real rates of capital gains, investment income and total returns on foreign equity assets and liabilities, respectively. 
The explanatory variables are the cyclical component of the domestic real GDP growth rate (for regressions on liabilities), of the rest of the world real 
GDP growth rate (assets) and the differential between the two (net positions), respectively. See text for definitions of all variables and explanations on the 
expected signs.  Estimation by least squares with AR(1) disturbances ((1) and (2)) and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) (3), 
respectively, and involving country and time fixed effects (except for (2)). ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Time period: 1971-2005. Data availability varies by country. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
Real GDP growth, cyclical component
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(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Expected sign + + –
Capital gains, liabilities    0.18 (0.09)**
Capital gains, assets   0.40 (0.15)***
Capital gains, net   -0.15 (0.05)***
Income, liabilities   -0.01 (0.00)**
Income, assets   -0.01 (0.01)
Income, net   -0.00 (0.00)
Total return, liabilities   0.13 (0.21)
Total return, assets   0.56 (0.22) ***
Total return, net   -0.20 (0.09)**
Capital gains, liabilities    0.18 (0.09)** - 0.001 (0.000)
Capital gains, assets   0.42 (0.15)***   0.001 (0.000)**
Capital gains, net   -0.15 (0.05)*** - 0.001 (0.001)***
Income, liabilities   -0.01 (0.00)**   0.00 (0.000)
Income, assets   -0.00 (0.00)   0.000 (0.000)***
Income, net   -0.00 (0.00)   0.000 (0.000)
Total return, liabilities   0.14 (0.22)   0.005 (0.010)
Total return, assets   0.59 (0.22) ***   0.001 (0.000)*
Total return, net   -0.20 (0.09)** - 0.002 (0.000)**
Capital gains, liabilities   0.13 (0.07)*   0.111 (0.015)***
Capital gains, assets   0.39 (0.15)***   0.027 (0.005)***
Capital gains, net  -0.14 (0.05)***  -0.008 (0.031)
Income, liabilities  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.004 (0.001)***
Income, assets  -0.00 (0.01)   0.003 (0.001)***
Income, net  -0.00 (0.00)  -0.002 (0.001)**
Total return, liabilities   0.06 (0.19)   0.199 (0.003)***
Total return, assets   0.56 (0.22) ***   0.026 (0.012)**
Total return, net  -0.18 (0.10)*  -0.011 (0.029)
Table 3: Cyclicality of capital gains, income and returns on international portfolio holdings
(Estimated regression coefficients, dependent variables scaled by domestic GDP)
Panel C: With financial holdings
Control variables
Notes: The dependent variables are capital gains, investment income and returns on foreign equity assets and liabilities (scaled by nominal GDP), respectively. The 
explanatory variables are the cyclical component of the domestic real GDP growth rate (for regressions on liabilities), of the rest of the world real GDP growth rate (assets) 
and the differential between the two (net positions), respectively. Panel B includes a time trend, Financial holdings in Panel C is the ratio of total foreign portfolio equity 
assets and liabilities to GDP. See text for definitions of all variables and explanations on the expected signs. Estimation by least squares with AR(1) disturbances ((1) and 
(2)) and heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) (3), respectively, and involving country and time fixed effects (except for (2)). ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Time period: 1971-2005. Data availability varies by country. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
Panel A: Without control variables
Time trend Financial holdings
Real GDP growth, cyclical component
Panel B: With time trend
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Expected sign + + - + + -
World 1.70*** 3.30*** -1.41* 1.22 6.22*** -1.84*
Industrial countries 0.31 3.00*** 0.37 -0.64 7.30*** 0.73
Euro area countries 2.02 3.47*** -1.40 0.18 8.52*** 2.30
Emerging market economies 0.81 4.32* -1.60 1.45 4.48 -2.05
Notes: Estimations as in Table 2. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
Capital gains Capital gains
Table 4: Cyclicality of capital gains, by country group and time period
(Estimated regression coefficients, dependent variables: implied real rates of return )
1971-2005 1993 - 2005
Liabilities Assets Net Liabilities Assets Net
Expected sign + + - + + -
World 0.18** 0.40*** -0.15*** 0.23 1.23*** -0.21***
Industrial countries 0.22 0.43*** -0.14* 0.53 1.81*** -0.49*
Euro area countries 0.14 0.37** -0.25 0.7 1.76*** -1.24
Emerging market economies 0.20*** 0.31 -0.08 0.19* 0.51 -0.08
Notes: Estimations as in Table 3. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
Capital gains Capital gains
Table 5: Cyclicality of capital gains, by country group and time period
(Estimated regression coefficients, dependent variables scaled by domestic GDP)




Capital gains, liabilities  1.39 (0.35)*** -1.77 (0.49)***
Capital gains, liabilities  1.02 (0.36)*** -1.88 (0.48)***  1.19 (0.28)***
Capital gains, assets  0.32 (0.42) -0.93 (0.46)**
Capital gains, assets  0.41 (0.49) -1.02 (0.53)*  2.35 (0.60)***
Capital gains, net -0.92 (0.37)**  0.15 (0.22)  0.91 (0.71)
Capital gains, net -0.78 (0.40)*  0.10 (0.21)  0.97 (0.73) -0.04 (0.24) -0.33 (0.34)
Interaction terms with real GDP growth
Notes:  Estimations as in Table 3, augmented with interaction terms of real GDP growth with home bias of the investing country (HB), home bias of the rest of 
the world (HB
W), domestic stock market capitalisation as a ratio to GDP (MCAP) and stock market capitalisation in the rest of the world (MCAP
W). Full 
regression outputs are available upon request.
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Euro Area Emerging 
Market 
Economies
 β 0.73 0.50 0.58 0.90
(0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.10)*** (0.07)***
Observations 660 473 211 187
R
2
0.50 0.39 0.52 0.70
 β 1 0.73 0.58 0.65 0.89
(0.07)*** (0.07)*** (0.11)*** (0.09)***
 β 2  0.01  0.50  0.63 0.05
(0.15) (0.13)*** (0.16)*** (0.15)
Observations 660 473 211 187
R
2
0.50 0.40 0.54 0.70
 β 1 0.75 0.60 0.18 1.23
(0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.18) (0.15)***
 β 2 0.16 0.12  0.57 1.09
(0.04)*** (0.05)*** (0.23)** (0.83)
Observations 660 473 211 187
R
2
0.49 0.52 0.76 0.66
 β 1 0.82 0.78 0.17 1.09
(0.07)*** (0.09)*** (0.17) (0.16)***
 β 2  0.09  0.09 0.40  0.45
(0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.18)** (0.32)
Observations 660 473 211 187
R
2
0.71 0.74 0.91 0.71
 β 1 0.88 0.65 0.71 1.02
(0.11)*** (0.10)*** (0.15)*** (0.06)***
 β 2  0.20  0.14  0.05  0.28
(0.05)*** (0.06)** (0.23) (0.16)*
Observations 660 473 211 187
R
2
0.50 0.45 0.66 0.81
 β 1 0.62 0.51 0.48 1.04
(0.07)*** (0.08)*** (0.13)*** (0.15)***
 β 2 0.97 1.12 1.27 2.86
(0.50)* (0.50)** (0.85) (3.69)
Observations 589 449 211 140
R
2
0.58 0.62 0.81 0.72
 β 1 0.58 0.47 0.52 1.34
(0.12)*** (0.15)*** (0.14)*** (0.13)***
 β 2  0.02  0.03  0.02 0.76
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.30)**
Observations 589 449 211 140
R
2
0.77 0.78 0.96 0.78
Notes:  The dependent variables is the cyclical component of consumption growth, ß and β1 denote 
the coefficient on  the cyclical component of output growth.  Financial equity holdings  is the ratio 
of total foreign portfolio equity assets and liabilities to GDP. β2 denotes the coefficient on the 
country by country cyclicality coefficient of  net capital gains, capital gains on liabilities, capital gains 
on assets, net investment income flows and net total returns on international portfolio equity 
investments (as ratios to GDP ), respectively. See text for definitions of all variables. Estimation by 
least squares with heteroskedasticity robust standard errors (in parentheses) and involving time fixed 
effects. ***, ** ,* denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. Time period: 
1971 2005. Data availability varies by country. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
A. Overall
B. Interaction with financial equity holdings
C. Interaction with cyclicality of net capital gains
G. Interaction with cyclicality of net total returns
D. Interaction with cyclicality of capital gains on foreign liabilities
E. Interaction with cyclicality of capital gains on foreign assets
F. Interaction with cyclicality of net investment income flows










Euro Area Emerging Market 
Economies
 β 0.70 0.29 0.24 0.91
(0.08)*** (0.09)*** (0.11)** (0.08)***
Observations 386 214 102 148
R
2
0.46 0.28 0.50 0.70
 β 1 0.68 0.41 0.40 0.89
(0.09)*** (0.10)*** (0.13)*** (0.09)***
 β 2 0.06 -0.32 -0.44 0.06
(0.15) (0.13)** (0.16)*** (0.15)
Observations 386 214 102 148
R
2
0.47 0.29 0.53 0.70
 β 1 0.64 0.30 0.27 1.05
(0.15)*** (0.16)* (0.32) (0.15)***
 β 2 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.21
(0.03)* (0.03) (0.05) (0.30)
Observations 362 214 102 148
R
2
0.59 0.66 0.84 0.75
 β 1 0.31 0.18 0.33 1.26
(0.13)** (0.15) (0.30) (0.14)***
 β 2 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.35
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.10)***
Observations 362 214 102 148
R
2
0.61 0.64 0.88 0.78
 β 1 0.58 0.42 0.51 0.94
(0.17)*** (0.16)** (0.15)*** (0.11)***
 β 2 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.00
(0.02)* (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 362 214 102 148
R
2
0.70 0.34 0.87 0.97
 β 1 0.47 0.34 0.30 1.02
(0.09)*** (0.12)*** (0.24) (0.12)***
 β 2 -0.91 -0.91 -0.51 9.06
(0.90) (0.89) (1.94) (2.02)***
Observations 316 202 102 114
R
2
0.47 0.52 0.65 0.57
 β 1 0.30 0.18 0.28 1.03
(0.15)** (0.18) (0.26) (0.20)***
 β 2 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.25
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.32)
Observations 316 202 102 114
R
2
0.55 0.59 0.83 0.55
Notes: Estimations as in Table 7. Full regression outputs are available upon request.
A. Overall
B. Interaction with financial holdings
C. Interaction with cyclicality of net capital gains
G. Interaction with cyclicality of net total returns
D. Interaction with cyclicality of capital gains on foreign liabilities
E. Interaction with cyclicality of capital gains on foreign assets
F. Interaction with cyclicality of net investment income flows
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